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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CYNTHIA DAHL, widow of 
Steven B. Dahl, deceased 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, REVLON 
SERVICE, INC., and/or LIBERTY 
MUTUAL and/or DEFAULT 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS REVLON SERVICE INC., 
AND/OR LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The sole issue to be decided on appeal is whether 
there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to 
sustain the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that the 
appellant is not entitled to dependency benefits under Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Law because she was not a dependent of 
the deceased at the time of his death. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Steven B. Dahl, an employee of respondent Revlon 
Service, Inc., died in an airplane crash at the Dallas/Fort 
Worth Airport on August 2, 1985, while in the course of his 
employment. At the time of his death, Mr. Dahl and his wife, 
Case-No. 860319 
Category No. 6 
the appellant herein, were not living together and they were in 
the process of obtaining a divorce. On September 3, 1985, one 
month after Mr. Dahl's death, the Commission issued a Death 
Benefits Order requiring respondents Revlon Service, Inc., 
and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, to pay into the 
Default Indemnity Fund statutory death benefits in the amount 
of $30,000.00. Said defendants were also ordered to pay the 
statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00. Pursuant to this 
Order, respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company paid the 
aforementioned amounts to the Default Indemnity Fund and to the 
executor of the estate of the deceased. 
On December 12, 1985, appellant, Cynthia Dahl, filed 
a Claim for Dependent's Benefits with the Commission. A 
hearing on the appellant's application was held on March 12, 
1986, before Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen. On 
March 17, 1986, Judge Allen issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, denying the appellant's claim 
and reaffirming the Commission's prior order of September 3rd. 
Thereafter, the applicant filed a Motion for Review with the 
Commission. After considering the applicant's motion, the 
Commission issued a memorandum opinion affirming the Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellant Cynthia Dahl and the deceased, 
Steven Bradley Dahl, were married on October 22, 1978 in 
Colorado. (R. at 31) 
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2. At the time of her marriage to Mr. Dahl, 
appellant was employed by Frontier Airlines as a flight 
attendant and she has continued to work for Frontier up through 
the present time. (R. at 31-32) 
3. Mr. Dahl obtained employment with Revlon 
Service, Inc., shortly after their marriage and in September, 
1979, he and appellant moved to Utah due to the demands of 
their various employments. (R. at 32) 
4. After moving to Utah, appellant and Mr. Dahl 
purchased a home in Sandy where they resided together until 
November 1984. (R. at 32, 38) 
5. On February 6, 1984, Mr. Dahl suffered a 
heart attack which left him hospitalized for approximately one 
month. (R. at 35-3 6) 
6. Following his heart attack, appellant 
testified that the relationship between herself and Mr. Dahl 
changed. Mr. Dahl spent more and more of his time working and 
eventually he and the appellant "just stopped communicating." 
(R. at 36) 
7. In November of 1984, appellant voluntarily 
left Mr. Dahl and the family home in Sandy and moved into a 
townhouse with a girlfriend in Aurora, Colorado. (R. at 37-38) 
8. Although the appellant testified this 
separation was only temporary, Mr. Dahl filed a Complaint for 
Divorce in January, 1985. (R. at 38-39) 
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9. Furthermore, the appellant continued to 
reside in Colorado up to the time of Mr. Dahl's death in August 
of 1985, some ten months after she first left the family home. 
10. During the year appellant lived apart from 
Mr. Dahl, her salary for nine months of work was approximately 
$20,000.00. (R. at 106) 
11. While living in Colorado, the appellant 
received no direct monetary support from her husband. (R. at 
59.) 
12. In fact, appellant sent $200.00 per month to 
Mr. Dahl for three months immediately following her move to 
Colorado. (R. at 63) 
13. After appellant discontinued sending money to 
Mr. Dahl, neither party made any payments to the other up to 
the time of Mr. Dahl's death. (R. at 63.) 
14. Subsequent to the filing of Mr. Dahl's 
petition for divorce, appellant retained Paul Liapis as legal 
counsel to represent her in the divorce proceedings. Mr. 
Liapis prepared a Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking 
temporary support from Mr. Dahl in the amount of $750.00 per 
month. This motion was never heard, however, as the parties 
agreed prior to the hearing that if Mr. Dahl would maintain the 
mortgage payments on the house as well as the other joint debts 
of the parties during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, 
the motion would be dropped. (R. at 66-67; 144-148) 
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15. This agreement, however, did not obligate Mr. 
Dahl to pay any debts other than those on which he was already 
legally obligated. (R. at 80) 
16. A short time after the aforementioned 
agreement was reached, Mr. Liapis received a telephone call 
from appellant wherein she told him that she and Mr. Dahl were 
attempting to work out a settlement between themselves. Mr. 
Liapis subsequently prepared a Stipulation of Property 
Settlement Agreement and Consent to Default (hereinafter 
Property Settlement) in accordance with instructions given to 
him by the appellant. (R. at 72-74) 
17. Under the terms of the Property Settlement 
prepared at her direction, appellant unquestionably waived her 
right to receive alimony from Mr. Dahl. (R. at 80-81 & 160) 
18. A Property Settlement and Separation 
Agreement (hereinafter "Separation Agreement11) was also 
prepared by Mr. Green, counsel for Mr. Dahl. (R. at 165-172) 
19. The agreement prepared by Mr. Green was 
voluntarily signed by the appellant in front of a notary public 
on July 23, 1985. (R. at 41, 172) 
20. Under the terms of the Separation Agreement 
signed by appellant, she also waived her right to receive 
alimony from Mr. Dahl. (R. at 166) 
21. Both the Property Settlement and the 
Separation Agreement provided that Mr. Dahl would retain sole 
custody and possession of the family home and that he would be 
responsible for payment of the outstanding mortgage 
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obligation. The agreements differed, however, in that the 
Property Settlement required the home to be sold as soon as 
possible after the divorce with the equity then being divided 
equally between them, whereas the Separation Agreement allowed 
Mr. Dahl to keep the home and pay appelTant in cash for her 
share of the equity. (R. at 159, 166.) 
22. On August 2, 1985, Mr. Dahl Was killed in the 
crash of an airliner on which he was a passenger at the 
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport in Irving, Texas. (R. 
at 5) 
23. At the time of Mr. Dahl's death, no final 
decree of divorce had been entered by the District Court. (R. 
at 49) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah Workmen's Compensation Law, when the 
spouse of an employee killed during the scope and course of 
his/her employment is not living with the deceased at the time 
of death, the issue of dependency becomes a question of fact to 
be decided by the trier-of-fact. In the instant case, the 
appellant was not living with her estranged husband at the time 
he died. Thus, the question of her dependency becomes a 
question of fact for the Commission. The findings of fact of 
the Commission cannot be overturned on appeal unless they are 
unsupported by the evidence. In the instant case, the finding 
that appellant was not dependent on her husband at the time of 
his death is supported by substantial competent evidence. 
6 




THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CANNOT 
BE OVERTURNED ON APPEAL SO LONG AS -THEY ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Utah Code Ann., §35-1-84 (1953 as amended) 
provides that when reviewing an order of the Industrial 
Commission, the Supreme Court may affirm or set aside the award 
only upon the following grounds: 
(1) That the Commission acted without or 
in excess of its powers; and 
(2) That the findings of fact do not 
support the award. 
The standard of review identified in §35-1-84 is 
a very limited one as is evidenced by the decision in Blaine 
v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 700 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1985). 
Therein, the court stated: 
This Court has interpreted the foregoing 
statutory standard [§35-1-84] on 
numerous occasions and has concluded that 
the Commission's findings are not to be 
displaced in the absence of a showing that 
they are arbitrary and capricious. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
Id. at 1086. Findings of the Commission are deemed to be 
arbitrary and capricious only where there is no substantial 
competent evidence to support them. This fact is illustrated 
by the decision in Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 
217, 407 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1965), where the following comment 
was made: 
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This Court cannot properly reverse the 
Commission and compel an award unless there 
is credible evidence without substantial 
contradiction which points so clearly and 
persuasively m plaintiff's favor that 
failure to so find would justify the 
conclusion that the Commission acted 
capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably 
in disregarding or refusing to believe the 
evidence. 
See also State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah,, 685 
P2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1984) ("Our standard of review in 
Industrial Commission cases is stringent. . . .In reviewing 
questions of fact we defer to a great degree to the 
Commission's findings and reverse only where they are without 
foundation in the evidence."). In the case at bar, there is 
ample competent evidence in the record to support the findings 
and order of the Commission. Thus, the decision of the 
Commission must be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DEPENDENT ON MR. DAHL 
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH IS 
A QUESTION OF FACT 
The two statutes governing dependent's death benefits 
under Utah Workmen's Compensation law are Utah Code 
Annotated §35-1-68(2) and §35-1-71 (1986 Cumm. 
Supp.). The relevant portion of the former, 
§35-1-68(2)(b)(iv), reads as follows: 
For purposes of any dependency 
determination, a surviving spouse of a 
deceased employee shall be conclusively 
presumed to be wholly dependent for a 
six-year period from the date of death of 
the employee. 
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The scope of the conclusive presumption identified in the 
above-cited statutory provision is limited, however, by 
§35-1-71(2) which further states: 
For purposes of payments to be made under 
subsection (2)(b)(i) of section 35-1-68, a 
surviving husband or wife shall be presumed 
to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with 
whom he or she lived at the time of the 
employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of 
dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with the facts in 
each particular case existing at the time 
of the injury or death of such employee 
. . .. (Emphasis added.) 
The requirement that the surviving spouse be living with the 
deceased at the time of death in order for the conclusive 
presumption of dependency in §35-1-68 to apply has been 
recognized both by the appellant in her brief (See Appellant's 
brief p. 13) and by this Court in the case of Tuom v. Duane 
Hall Trucking, 675 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah 1984). *1 Because 
the appellant admittedly was not living with Mr. Dahl at the 
time of his death, she is not entitled to §35-1-68's 
conclusive presumption of dependency and her status as a 
*1 According to Donnita's argument, §35-1-68(2)(b)(iv) 
should be read as meaning that any surviving spouse is 
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a period of 
six years. However, that interpretation would cause this 
provision to conflict with the §35-1-71 direction that for 
purposes of death benefits under §35-1-68(2)(b)(i) a 
surviving spouse is presumed wholly dependent upon the decedent 
only if said spouse is living with the decedent at the time 
of death. These two sections were considered together and 
altered by the same amendatory legislation in 1979. They 
should be interpreted to avoid inconsistencies if possible. 
(Citation omitted.) (Emphasis in original.) 
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dependent thus becomes a question of fact to be determined by 
the Commission as the trier-of-fact. The role of the 
Commission as the fact finder in dependency proceedings was 
established early on in the case of Rigby v. Industrial 
Comm!n, 286 P. 628 (Utah 1930). In Rigby, the court stated: 
Whether one person is dependent upon 
another within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act is primarily a question of 
fact. It is the exclusive province of the 
Industrial Commission to determine the 
facts and to draw legitimate inferences 
therefrom. It is also, in the first 
instance, the province of the Commission to 
determine from such facts and inferences 
whether dependency does or does not 
exist. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 63 0. In the instant case, there are numerous facts in 
the record to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding 
that the appellant was not dependent on Mr. Dahl at the time of 
his death on August 2, 1985. Therefore, the ruling of the 
Administrative Law Judge as adopted by the Commission should 
not be disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
ESTABLISHING ACTUAL DEPENDENCY ON THE DECEASED AT 
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH ON AUGUST 2, 1985. 
A. In Order To Establish Actual Dependency, 
Appellant Must Show She Was Receiving Support In The 
Form Of Financial Or Other Comparable Assistance From 
The Deceased At The Time Of His Death 
In Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 
897, 898-899 (Utah 1975) this court stated: 
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The case law of this state has consistently 
limited dependency to those fact situations 
wherein the deceased had contributed 
financial assistance or comparable 
assistance such as growing food, which was 
used in supporting the dependant. 
(Footnote omitted). 
The court also cited with approval the following 
definition of a dependent found in Park Utah Consolidated 
Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 488 36 P.2d 
979 (1934): 
A dependent is one who looks to another for 
support, and the true criterion is whether 
one has a reasonable expectation of 
continuing or future support—to receive 
such contributions as are necessary and 
needed to maintain him in his accustomed 
station in life. 
In the instant case, the evidence adduced at the time of the 
hearing clearly established that the appellant was not 
receiving financial or other comparable assistance from the 
deceased at the time of his death. Furthermore, the appellant 
had no reasonable expectation of future support from Mr. Dahl 
as the evidence indicated she intended to waive all rights to 
alimony following termination of the marriage. Thus, appellant 
does not meet the definition of a dependent. Not only had she 
moved out of the family home and established a new place of 
residence in Aurora, Colorado approximately ten months prior to 
Mr. Dahl's death, but she also maintained all of her own living 
expenses throughout her separation from the deceased. This 
fact is evidenced by her own testimony as follows: 
A. Two months I sent him money. Until I 
had talked with Paul, and told him I could 
not live in Denver, plus give Steven money 
for the bills. Then that's when we started 
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talking about the Stipulation Agreement and 
stuff. 
Q. How much money did you send him? 
A. Oh, I think it was like $200.00 a month. 
Q. And that went on for— 
A. I only did that for three months. 
Q. For three months? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you pay him any other money? 
A. No. 
Q. And he didn't pay you any other money? 
A. No. 
(R. at 63) . 
It should be noted that appellant's legal counsel at 
one point prepared an "Order To Show Cause" seeking temporary 
support on her behalf during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings. The order was never heard by the court, however, 
as appellant agreed to drop its pursuit when Mr. Dahl agreed to 
assume the mortgage payments on the home together with some 
other joint debt obligations the couple had incurred during 
their marriage. 
Appellant claims the very preparation of the 
temporary support order establishes her dependency on the 
decedent. However, the Administrative Law Judge specifically 
noted in his Findings of Fact that he had some "serious doubts 
about the truthfulness and accuracy of that document," after 
reviewing it in light of the appellant's testimony at the time 
of the hearing. (R. at 206). He further stated that it was 
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his opinion the Motion and the expenses outlined therein were 
111
 padded1 for the purpose of leverage during the [divorce] 
litigation." (R. at 206). This conclusion of the 
Administrative Law Judge is reasonable in view of the fact that 
after appellant dropped her attempt to obtain temporary support 
from Mr. Dahl, she continued to maintain herself and a separate 
residence in Denver without any apparent difficulty and without 
any other attempts to obtain funds from the deceased. 
His conclusion is also supported by appellant's 
waiver of alimony in both the Property Settlement prepared by 
her own counsel at her request and pursuant to her instructions 
and the Separation Agreement prepared by counsel for Mr. Dahl. 
In both agreements the appellant forever waived her right to 
receive alimony in very clear and concise terms. For example, 
in the agreement prepared by Mr. Liapis it states: "Neither 
Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be required to pay any alimony 
whatsoever to the other, and the same shall be forever 
barred." (See attached Exhibit "A") It should be noted that 
although Mr. Liapis testified he was concerned about whether 
the agreement he prepared was a correct reflection of all of 
his client's terms, there was no doubt in his mind that 
appellant had instructed him to include the waiver of alimony 
provision. (See R. at 80-81). The waiver provision 
contained in the agreement prepared by Mr. Green was also very 
clear: "Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should 
be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set 
aside." (See attached Exhibit "B") This particular agreement 
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was voluntarily signed by the appellant in front of a notary 
public on July 25, 1985, just a few days prior to the 
decedent's death. In the case of Tuom v. Duane Hall 
Trucking, cited earlier, this court noted: 
[A]ny substantial period of time without 
support may signal a cessation of support, 
even if there is no other evidence of that 
intent. Similarly, the failure of a 
previously dependent person to pursue 
practical remedies to encourage or legal 
remedies to compel continued support may 
signal acquiescence in the end of a state 
of total or partial dependency. 
Tuom at 1203. 
Appellant also contends that consideration of the 
waiver of alimony provision in the agreement she signed as 
evidence of her lack of dependency constitutes error because 
the district court hearing the divorce proceedings had not 
approved it prior to Mr. Dahl's death. Whether or not the 
waiver provision was enforceable at the time Mr. Dahl died, 
however, the Administrative Law Judge is entitled to consider 
it in relation to all of the other evidence for purposes of 
establishing the intent and expectations of the parties. In 
the instant case, a final hearing in the divorce proceedings 
was scheduled on August 7, 1985. Appellant's signing of the 
Separation Agreement shortly prior to that time reasonably 
suggests that she was not expecting the receipt of support from 
Mr. Dahl after their marriage was terminated. That such 
inferences may be drawn by the hearing officer is supported by 
the decision in Penn Sanitation Co. v. Hoskins, 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 
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528, 312 A.2d 458 (1973). In Penn the claimant and the 
decedent were separated at the time of the decedentfs death. 
The Pennsylvania Workman's Compensation Act provided that no 
compensation would be paid to a widow unless she was living 
with her husband at the time of his death or was "then actually 
dependent upon him and receiving from him a substantial portion 
of her support." The court found that the claimant was not 
dependent upon the decedent for support and thus not entitled 
to benefits because of a support order that the wife had sought 
and obtained just one month prior to her husband's death. The 
order in question sought support only for the two children of 
the claimant and deceased. The claimant had obtained a prior 
order after an earlier separation which also sought support for 
herself. The court held: 
The second support order provided only for 
the support of the 'two children'. This 
order, as in Hendricks v. Bethlehem Steel 
Co., 150 Pa.Super. 257, 27 A.2d 264 
(1942), was limited to the children and did 
not include support of the wife. The 
order was acquiesced in by the wife, 
(citation omitted) and such acquiescence 
bars recovery, Hendricks, supra. 
(Emphasis in original). 
Id. at 459. Just as the failure of the claimant in Penn to 
seek support for herself barred her recovery of dependency 
benefits, the failure of the appellant herein to seek temporary 
support and/or alimony on her own behalf is evidence of her 
acquiescence in Mr. Dahl's failure to support her and of her 
ability to maintain herself without such support. 
B. The Mere Existence Of Joint Financial Obligations 
Does Not Establish Dependency Where The Parties Are 
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Voluntarily Separated And Each Is Maintaining His or 
Her Own Living Expenses Prior To Death. 
Appellant contends on appeal that the finding she was 
not dependent on her husband at the time of his death was error 
as a matter of law because the Administrative Law Judge did not 
interpret the word "support" to include "payments related to 
debt assumption." (Appellant's brief, p.12)' It is the 
defendant's position, however, that the mere existence of joint 
financial obligations is not sufficient to establish dependency 
in cases where the parties are voluntarily separated and each 
is maintaining his or her own living expenses prior to the 
death at issue. This position is supported by case law in 
other jurisdictions addressing the same argument appellant has 
raised . For example, in the case of City of Aurora v. 
Claimant in Death of Corr, 689 P.2d 659 (Colorado Appellate 
1984), the Colorado Court of Appeals stated: 
We also find as a matter of law that the 
mere existence of joint obligations after 
separation and filing of a dissolution of 
marriage petition does not, under 
§8-50-101, indicate partial dependency 
between an estranged couple voluntarily 
living apart and supporting themselves by 
their individual earnings. 
Colorado Statute §8-50-101 provided in pertinent part as 
follows: 
[T]he following described persons shall be 
presumed to be wholly dependent (however, 
such presumption may be rebutted by 
competent evidence): 
(a) widow or widower, unless it is 
shown that she or he was voluntarily 
separated and living apart from the 
spouse at the time of the injury or 
death or was not dependent in whole or 
16 
in part on the deceased for support 
• • . . 
Id, at 661. Admittedly the governing Colorado statute in 
City of Aurora is not exactly like the Utah statutes at issue 
herein. It does, however, make dependency a question of fact 
as in the case at bar. Furthermore, the court's finding that 
the mere existence of joint obligations does not establish 
dependency was made under facts very similar to those at issue 
herein. In City of Aurora, the claimant's wife suffered a 
fatal employment related accident on June 27, 1981. Just 
twelve days before her death, the claimant had filed a petition 
for divorce which the decedent had signed as a co-petitioner. 
A hearing on the claimant's application for benefits 
established that the parties had been separated since May 30, 
1981, with the claimant living in the marital home and the 
decedent maintaining her own apartment. It was also shown that 
the parties earned similar salaries, that each had been paying 
his or her own living expenses, "and that they were sharing or 
planning to share responsibility for the payment of joint 
obligations which were incurred during their marriage." 
Although the evidence adduced in the instant case indicated Mr. 
Dahl's agreement to assume full responsibility for the parties' 
joint obligations during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings, it also established that they intended to share 
responsibility for their joint obligations following 
dissolution of the marriage with the exception of the family 
home. The mortgage payments on the home, on the other hand, 
were to made solely by Mr. Dahl so long as the home remained 
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unsold as he was the party residing in the home and obtaining 
the benefit of residency in the home. Also, as in City of 
Aurora, during their separation, with the exception of the 
three $200.00 payments appellant sent to the deceased, each 
party paid their own living expenses without anv aid from the 
other. And finally, although the appellant's -salary did not 
match the decedent's at the time of his death, 'her income was 
substantial. In fact, the appellant testified that her actual 
income in 1985, the year the decedent died, was approximately 
$2 0,000.00 and this amount represented only a nine month work 
year as she did not work for the three months following Mr. 
Dahl's death. 
The argument raised by appellant that dependency may 
be established by the payment by one spouse of joint 
obligations was also rejected by the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania in S and S Associates, Inc. v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board (Hochman), 465 A.2d 57 (Pa.Cmwlth. 
1983) . In S and S, the claimant and her husband had been 
separated for approximately two-and-a-half years prior to his 
death. He had been living in the residence owned jointly by 
himself and the claimant. Both the claimant and the deceased 
were employed and the claimant received no support payments 
from her husband during their separation. Furthermore, shortly 
before his death the deceased had initiated divorce proceedings 
against the claimant. During the period of the claimant's and 
the deceased's separation, the deceased made the payments on 
the mortgage on the jointly-owned house as well as payments on 
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a note which his estranged wife had co-signed. The Court 
rejected the claimant's position that the payment by the 
deceased of these joint obligations constituted support and 
stated: 
The referee found and the Board affirmed 
that Sylvia Hochman was dependent on her 
estranged husband for support within the 
purview of Section 3 07 because he continued 
to make payments on debts for which Sylvia 
Hochman was jointly liable. We 
disagree. One of the debts was a mortgage 
on the property which Sylvia Hochman had 
left and in which Seymour Hochman continued 
to live; the other was a loan for Seymour 
Hochman1s business for which the house 
stood as collateral. The benefit of 
continued payment on both these debts would 
enure primarily to Seymour Hochman. In 
light of his failure to provide any support 
payments to his wife and his removal of his 
wife and daughter from his medical 
insurance plan, as well as the institution 
of divorce proceedings for desertion, we 
cannot characterize the payment on debts to 
sustain his business and his home as 
support for his estranged wife. (Emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 58-59. In view of the decision of the above cited 
courts and in view of the fact appellant had maintained her own 
living quarters and had paid her own living expenses without 
any financial assistance from the deceased for nearly ten 
months prior to his death, defendants contend that the payment 
of the mortgage on the couple's home during the time Mr. Dahl 
was living in the home and accruing the benefit of residency in 
the home can not be construed as support of the appellant 
sufficient to establish her dependency on the deceased on 
August 2, 1985, as a matter of law. The fact appellant chose 
to move back into the family residence after Mr. Dahl's death 
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is irrelevant to the issue of her dependency at the time of his 
death. When Mr. Dahl died, appellant was not living in the 
family home, neither was she obligated to make the mortgage 
payments on the home for such had been assumed by her husband. 
Although the mortgage payments are now being made by her, 
appellant has also received the added value of Mr. Dahl's share 
of the equity in the home. Furthermore, since she is no longer 
living in Colorado, she no longer has the living expenses 
associated with maintaining that household. In view of these 
facts and the others previously discussed, appellant failed to 
establish her dependency on the decedent at the time of his 
death. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah workmenf s compensation law where a 
claimant is not living with his or her spouse at the time of 
death, the issue of dependency becomes a question of fact. The 
Commission, as the trier-of-fact, is entitled to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh all of the evidence 
in reaching a conclusion. In the instant case, the 
Administrative Law Judge specifically questioned the 
credibility of some of the evidence presented at the time of 
the hearing. Furthermore, after reviewing all of the evidence 
before him, he determined that appellant was not, in fact, 
dependent on the deceased, Steven B. Dahl, at the time of his 
death on August 2, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge's order 
is supported by substantial competent evidence and it is in 
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accordance with the provisions of Utah law. Therefore, the 
order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^=^ t# day of January, 1987 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
St NELSON 
:CIJXEL E. DYER 
STEPHANIE A. MALLORY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
21 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this ^ yt//1 day of January, 1987, to the following counsel 
of record: 
FRANK J. GUSTIN 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
48 Post Office Place 
Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
SUZAN PIXTON, ADMINISTRATOR 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND 
Utah Industrial Commission 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Telephone: (801) 530-6989 
DAHL1/SMW 
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ADDENDUM 
PAUL H. LIAPIS - 1956 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 53 2-69 96 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL, 
Defendant• 
STIPULATION OF PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND CONSENT TO DEFAULT 
.Civil No. D 85-38 
Judge Frederick 
ooOoo 
Plaintiff, STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, and Defendant, CYNTHIA ZOE 
DAHL, by and through their respective attorneys, Frederick N. 
Green and Paul H. Liapis, hereby stipulate and agree to the 
follov/ing Settlement Agreement with regard to the distribution of 
real and personal property, the payment of debts accumulated by 
the parties, payment of support and other related matters, and, 
subject to approval by the Court of this Agreement and its 
incorporation into a Decree of Divorce, 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the Plaintiff subject to the terms of this Stipulation of 
Property Settlement Agreement as set forth below, and this' 
WDUSTRI/AL OCT' -,,-., 
EXHIBIT NO. 
Agreement is executed in the contemplation of continuing and 
permanent separation and divorce. 
2. Plaintiff hereby agrees and consents that his default 
may be entered herein, that the matter mav be heard by the Court 
on its merits at any time and without further notice to him, that 
this Agreement is a complete settlement of all rights either 
party may have in the other's property, whether presently 
existing or hereafter acquired, that Plaintiff consents that his 
Complaint for Divorce can be withdrawn and that Defendant may 
pursue this matter on her Counterclaim. 
Plaintiff further understands that the Court may, for good 
cause shown, waive the 90-day waiting period as provided by § 
30-3-18 Utah Code Ann. (1953)
 f as well as the three-month waiting 
period as provided by § 30-3-7 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and 
Plaintiff further understands that the Court may hold an 
immediate hearing upon the Counterclaim and enter judgment 
against the Plaintiff without further notice and may allow the 
Decree to become final and absolute upon signing and entry, and 
Plaintiff further expressly consents and, in fact, believes it to 
be in the best interests of the parties that both periods be 
waived and the divorce become final upon signing and entry. 
3. During the course of the marriage, Plaintiff and 
Defendant have acquired certain items of real and personal 
property and have incurred certain debts and obligations, all of 
which are part of this Stipulation, and the parties acknowledge 
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that the division as set forth herein is satisfactory between 
them and that, in accordance with this Agreement, each party 
shall own, free and clear of any claim of the other, the items of 
personal property and distribution as set forth herein and that 
each party shall be free to dispose of all items, of property 
which may hereafter be acquired by him or her as fully and 
effectively as if he or she were unmarried. 
In connection with the foregoing provision, it is agreed 
that the following property shall be divided between the parties 
as follows: 
A. The home of the parties located at 11551 South 
Hidden Valley Boulevard, Sandy, Utah, shall be sold for the 
highest attainable market price and at the earliest possible 
time, with all mortgages and encumbrances and the commission 
and closing costs to be paid from the gross proceeds 
received therefrom and with the balance divided equally 
between the parties. Plaintiff shall have the use and 
possession of this home until such sale and shall assume and 
pay the mortgage payments thereon until the home is sold. 
Both parties shall cooperate in their efforts at achieving a 
sale in this matter, and Defendant shall be kept advised as 
to all offers, open houses and other efforts toward the sale 
of this home. 
B. Plaintiff shall be awarded as his sole and 
separate property his bank accounts; the furniture, 
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furnishings and appliances presently in his possession and 
under his control, including, but not limited to, the 
washer, dryer, refrigerator, snow blower, lawn mower and 
one-half of the silver wedding gifts (with the exception of 
the antiques given to the parties by Defendant's father 
which should be returned to her); his retirement account 
with Revlon; and his personal clothing, effects and 
belongings. 
C. Defendant shall be awarded as her sole and 
separate property her bank accounts; the furniture, 
furnishings and appliances presently in her possession and 
under her control, including, but not limited to, the 
microwave oven, Hoover vacuum cleaner and one-half of the 
silver wedding gifts; all items of antiques given to 
Defendant by her father and family; her retirement account 
with Frontier Airlines, the 1984 Pontiac Fiero; the two U.S. 
Savings Bonds in her name; and her personal effects, 
clothing, jewelry and belongings. 
D. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be required 
to pay any alimony whatsoever to the other, and the same 
shall be forever barred, 
E. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be awarded 
their separate life insurance policies on their individual 
lives and their own health, accident and hospitalization 
insurance coverage to do with as they choose. 
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F. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each assume and pay 
any debts and obligations they have incurred in their own 
names since the separation of the parties on December 20, 
1984, and hold the other party harmless therefrom, 
G. The parties acknowledge that they, owe the 
following debts and obligations: Advanced Mortgage - first 
mortgage on home; Frontier Credit Union - Defendant's car; 
First Security VISA; Plaintiff's American Express card; 
Defendant's American Express card; Nordstroms; Weinstocks; 
ZCMI; Sears; Penneys; Mervyns; The Bon; Castletons; GECC; 
Frontier Credit Union VISA; and Dr, Bruce Brewer>-
1. It is agreed by and between the parties that 
the Plaintiff will assume and pay the first mortgage 
payment on the home; his American Express card; General 
Electric Credit Corporation; one-half of the First 
Security VISA; one-half of the accounts with 
Nordstroms, Weinstocks, ZCMI, Sears, Penneysf Mervyns, 
Castletons and Dr. Bruce Brewer, 
2. Defendant shall assume and pay the obligation 
to Frontier Credit Union on her automobile; her 
American Express card; one-half of the First Security 
VISA; one-half of the credit cards to Nordstroms, 
Weinstocks, ZCMI, Sears, Penneys, Mervyns and 
Castletons; her account with The Bon; her VISA account 
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with Frontier Credit Union; and one-half of Dr. Bruce 
Brewer's bill. 
3. Those debts to be shared jointly by the 
parties shall initially be assumed and paid for by the 
Plaintiff until the home is sold', at which time, he 
will be reimbursed for one-half of those amounts he can 
prove he has paid to the creditors representing 
Defendant's share of those obligations. The balance of 
her share of the proceeds shall be given to her 
following the accounting thereon. 
H. The parties shall each pay their own attorney's 
fees in connection with this action. 
4. Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate with 
the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes in 
titles to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change the 
names and responsibilities for payment upon the charge accounts 
and other debts divided herein, and to cooperate in each and 
every other way necessary or proper to insure that the Agreement 
entered into is carried out in every detail. 
5. In the event either party to this Agreement defaults in 
his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall be 
liable to the other party for all reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred in the enforcement of the obligations 
created by this Agreement. 
6 
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6, The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete 
settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's 
property, whether presently existing or hereafter acquired. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their 
hands this day of
 : , 1985„* 
STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL 
Plaintiff 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL 
Defendant 
PAUL H. LIAPIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Appeared before me this day of April, 1985, the 
above-named Plaintiff, STEVEN BRADLEY DAHL, who, after being duly 
sworn on oath and after reading the provisions and terms of the 
foregoing Stipulation, acknowledged to me that the same was 
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understood and signed as Plaintiff's own free act and desire, 
without fraud, duress, or undue influence. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Appeared before me this day of , 1985, the 
above-named Defendant, CYNTHIA ZOE DAHL, who, after being duly 
sworn on oath and after reading the provisions and terms of the 
foregoing Stipulation, acknowledged to me that the same was 
understood and signed as Defendant's own free act and desire, 
without fraud, duress, or undue influence. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
8 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (1240) 
At torney f o r P l a i n t i f f 
900 Newhouse Bui ld ing 
10 Exchange P lace 
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BRADLEY DAHL, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
ZOE DAHL, ) 
Defendant. ) 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and has been such for a period in excess of three months 
prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife 
having been married on the 22nd day of October, 1978, in Aurora, 
Colorado, 
3. No children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected. 
4. During the course of the marriage,, the Defendant has 
treated Plaintiff cruelly causina him great mental distress and 
making it totally impossible to continue the marriage 
Page -1- KDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTM 
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relationship. 
5. Neither party is entitled to alimony and none should 
be awarded and the rights thereto should be entirely set aside. 
6. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acguired an interest in a home and real property located at the 
street address commonly referred to as 11551 South Hidden Valley 
Boulevard/ in Salt Lake County/ State of Utah. The parties agree 
that the home and real property has a current eguity of 
$23/214.00. The parties agree that each party should be awarded 
an interest in the home and real property egual to one-half the 
eguity of the parties therein after deducting the reasonable 
expenses of sale and closing which the parties agree shall be 
egual to seven percent (7%) of the value of the homef which/ it 
is agreed by the parties, it egual to $95/500.00. Plaintiff will 
pay Defendant for her share of the equity in the home and real 
property of the parties, in full, on or before the 1st day of 
August/ 1985. The Defendant shall execute a Quit Claim Deed in 
favor of the Plaintiff and shall be granted a recordable lien 
representing her interest in the eguity of the parties. The 
Plaintiff is awarded the sole custody and possession of the home 
and real property of the parties subject to Defendant's interest 
as set forth herein. Plaintiff shall bear the sole and separate 
responsibility for the home mortgage installments. 
7. The parties agree to pay, in egual amounts/ the 
following debts and obligations/ in the amounts as they appeared 
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as of the 20th day of December/ 1984, such* that each parties' 
share will be approximately $3,358.64: vjA^O 
a. VISA - Rocky Mountain 
b. Fashion Bar 
c. Nordstroms 




h. Bohm Allen 
i. K.G. Mens Store 
j. VISA - Salt Lake City, Utah. 
k. ZCMI 
1. Bank Loan 
m. Mervyns 
8. In the event the Defendnt does not pay the 
obligations and debts as set forth herein- then the amount that 
Defendant agreed to pay, and did not pay will be deducted from 
her share of the home equity prior to the payment thereof to 
Defendant. 
9. The Defendant agrees to return all credit cards in 
her possession for which the Plaintiff may be jointly liable. 
10. The parties agree and stipulate that as of December 
20, 1984, the home payments were three months in arrears. The 
parties agree to divide equally the liability for those three 
Page -3-
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months home payments and, in the event that one party or the 
other has paid those payments, then the other party will 
reimburse him or her for 50% of that amount. In the event that 
Plaintiff pays those three months home payments and the Defendant 
fails to reimburse him for one-half of that amount, then that 
amount will be deducted from the share of .Defendant's home equity 
of the parties. 
11. The parties agree to hold the other harmless as to 
the debts and obligations assumed by that party in this 
agreement. 
12. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired certin items of personal property which should be 
divided between the parties as follows: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
a. All personal property brought into the 
marriage. 
b. All gifts from the Defendant. 
c. Major household appliances including 
washer/dryer and refrigerator. 
d. Fifty percent of the marriage gifts. 
e. Plaintiff's personal effects and clothing. 
f. The personal property presently located at the 
home of the parties subject to those items designated to 
belong to the Defendant hereafter. 
TO THE DEFENDANT: 
Pane -4-
a. All personal orooertv brouaht into the* marriage 
by Defendant. 
b. All gifts from the Plaintiff. 
c. Fifty percent of the marriage gifts. 
d. Defendant's personal property and clothing. 
e. Housekeeping items such as pots, pans, towels, 
and sheets, etc., be agreement of the parties. 
f. The Defendant's gifts from her father including 
antiques presently in the posnefjnLon of t-.ho PJ/ilntirr. 
13. In addition to the personal property referred to 
above, the Defendant shall be awarded the interest of the parties 
in the 1984 Pontiac Fiero in possession of the Defendant subject 
to any indebtedness thereon which Defendant shall pay and hold 
the Plaintiff harmless thereon. 
14. The parties should be awarded his or her own 
separate savings accounts, checking accounts, money market 
accounts, credit union accounts and the like, if any, without any 
claim by the other. 
15. Each party should be awarded his or her own 
retirement, pension, or profit sharing plan, if any, free of any 
claim by the other. 
16. Each party will pay his or her own attorney's fees 
incurred in the bringing and prosectution of this matter or its 
defense. 
17. This Agreement shall not be deemed a condonation by 
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either party of the act or acts claimed by either party to have 
caused the differences leading to the parties' separation. 
18. No modification or waiver of any of the terms of 
this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged. No waiver of any breach or default 
hereunder shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or 
default of the same or similar nature. 
19. Each party hereby specifically agrees to cooperate 
with the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes 
in title to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change 
the names and responsibilities for payment on the charge accounts 
and other way necessary to be proper to insure that the Agreement 
entered into is carried out in every detail. 
20. In the event ether party to this Agreement defaults 
in his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall 
be liable to the other for all reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of the obligations 
created by this Agreement. 
21. The parties agree that this Agreement is a complete 
settlement of all rights either party may have in the other's 
property whether presently existing or hereafter aquired. 
22. The above-named Defendant specifically stipulates 
and acknowledges as follows: 
a. That the Defendant agrees to allow her default 
to be entered on Plaintiff's Complaint subject to the 
Pane -6-
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terms and provisions of this Settlement Agreement; 
b. That said Defendant understands that the court 
may, for good cause shown, waive the ninety-daty waiting 
period provided by Section 30-3-18 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) and immediately hold a hearing upon the Complaint 
and enter Judgment against said Defendant without further 
notice and that said Defendnt consents to the same and, 
in fact believes it to be in the best interest of the 
parties to waive said period and requests the Court to 
waive said period; 
c. That said Defendant further understands that the 
Court may, for good cause shown, waive the three months 
waiting period providing by Section 30-3-7 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) and order that the Decree may become 
absolute upon entry and that, believing it to be in the 
best interests of both parties, said Defendant further 
requests the Court to waive the same; 
d. That Frederick N. Green, attorney for Plaintiff, 
represents only the Plaintiff in this matter and does not 
represent the Defendant for any purpose at any time; and 
e. That the above acknowledgements and stipulations 
are dependent upon and made in contemplation of the 
parties agreeing to and executing this Settlemebnt 
Agreement and the same being approved by the Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have hereunder set their 
Uiif hand on this 2.^ day of 
DATED this -^S~ day of <C?/A 
GREEN & BERRY 
, 1985, 
, 1985. 
tEDERICK N. GREEN 
;torney for Plaintiff 
(EN BRADLEY 
Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the j?S7 k day of Q , , 1985, before me, the 
undersigned officer, personally7appeared Steven Bradley Dahl who 
is known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed 
the same for the purposes therein contained. 
In witness whereof, I have Jiereunto set my hand and 
official seal this .zr/ft day of Q^£^, , 1985. 
l^'-Lst-^L/ 
My commission expires: 
^ / c 7, 
Notary -Public n 
Residing a 12 ^ /^ j^ c^c
 c 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL LIAPIS 
Attorney for Defendant 




COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the J'ira day of J ^ J L ^ , 1985, before me, the 
undersigned officer, personally appeared Cynthia Zoe Dahl who is 
known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and individually acknowledged that he executed 
the same for the purposes therein contained. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal this ^^J) day of TJJJji^ / 1985. 
0 
)tary Public 
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